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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a result of the government's use of these statements will now be excluded
by Miranda. Certainly this newest exclusionary principle should apply to
private statements unwittingly made in the presence of an electronic
eavesdropper. In such a case the defendant is clearly incriminating himself
without having been informed of his right to remain silent and without
having received the benefit of counsel, as guaranteed by the fifth and
sixth amendments, respectively2 °
Finally, the courts might choose to unequivocally establish a right
of privacy in Florida independent of the fourth amendment. Almost four
decades ago Justice Brandeis implied that such a path was preferable."
In the light of logic and recent decisions by this nation's highest court, 2
this latter route is both tenable and timely.
Electrical information devices for universal, tyrannical womb-
to-womb surveillance are causing a very serious dilemma between
our claim to privacy and the community's need to know. The
older, traditional ideas of private, isolated thoughts and actions
. . . are very seriously threatened by new methods of instan-
taneous electric information retrieval . . . . [R]emedial control
... must be exerted .... What's that buzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzing? 5
SANDRA ROTHENBERG
COMMENT BY PROSECUTOR ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE
TO TESTIFY AT PRELIMINARY HEARING
The defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated assault. At the
trial he took the stand to testify in his own behalf. During the course of
his cross-examination the prosecuting attorney elicited that the defendant
had not testified at the preliminary hearing. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, held, decision of the district court quashed: it is not
error for a prosecutor on cross-examination to interrogate the defendant
30. Among the noteworthy statements arising from Miranda are these:
[Wle hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation .... Id. at 1626.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Id at 1628.
For a discussion of Miranda and its impact on the law, see Taran, The New Right-
Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 20 U. MIM I L. REV. 893 (1966).
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is one of numerous recent cases
dealing with the right of privacy. Although the holding is inexact with regard to that
right, it is noteworthy that six members of the United States Supreme Court found that
such a right existed. See generally, 64 Micn. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965).
33. McLuHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 12 (1967).
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concerning his failure to testify at the preliminary hearing. State v. Hines,
195 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
Under the common law an accused in a criminal action was considered
an interested party and, therefore, was disqualified as a witness. By reason
of this incompetency, the defendant could neither be called as a witness
by the state nor take the stand to testify in his own behalf.1 Indeed, it was
not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the disability was
removed in this country,2 when almost all jurisdictions enacted statutory
provisions terminating the disqualification of a criminal defendant as a
witness.8 Influenced by the existing constitutional prohibitions against
compelled self-incrimination of an accused,4 these statutes allowed but did
not compel an accused to testify. The option to take the stand was left
solely to the determination of the defendant.5
Coinciding with his newly acquired ability to become a witness if he
chose to do so, a new and unique problem confronted an accused in a
criminal proceeding. Since he was now free to testify and explain to the
jury his version of the circumstances surrounding the charge, would the
triers of fact draw any adverse inference from his failure to do so?6 To
rectify this difficulty, legislation was enacted throughout the United
States designed to prevent the jury from drawing such an inference and
to further prevent any comment by either court or counsel which would
reflect upon the defendant's failure to testify.
7 Today, all but six states8
have statutorily protected a defendant from such incriminating comments.
1. C. McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE §§ 65, 122, 132 (1954).
2. C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 1, § 132; 8 J. Wic.oaoE, EVIDENCE § 2268 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
3. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 488.
4. See note 5 infra.
5. [T]he language of the constitutional provisions, generally that no one in a
criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness . . . against himself, seemed to fit
perfectly the case of an accused. Thus when the statute removed his disqualification,
and the legislatures provided, as they generally did, that he could be called "at
his own request and not otherwise," this legislative privilege not to be called or to be
required to testify was naturally assimilated to the constitutional privilege.
C. MCCoRMICx, EVIDENCE § 122, at 257 (1954) (emphasis added). See also FLA. STAT.
§ 918.09 (1963) which is typical of the "permissiveness" element of these various statutes.
6. See, e.g., Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213 (1871).
7. Florida's statute is illustrative of the statutes which preclude adverse comment upon
a defendant's failure to testify. The statute provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness
in his own behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses,
but no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall
any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment on the
failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no
testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding
argument before the jury.
FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1963) (emphasis added.) For a comprehensive presentation of the
statutory prohibitions throughout the United States regarding comment on an accused's
failure to testify, see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2272.
8. The six states which allow comment in one form or another do so either by con-
stitutional provision (California and Ohio), by judicial decision (Connecticut, Iowa
and New Jersey-the latter two states having no specific constitutional privilege),
or by rules of court procedure (New Mexico).
8 J. WIGmORE, supra note 2, § 2272, at 427.
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Nothwithstanding these safeguards which presumably protect a
defendant from any adverse inference or comment upon his failure to
offer testimony, a very practical problem confronts an accused during
his trial. Regardless of instructions to the contrary, the jury may not be
able to ignore the feeling that the absence of testimony by the accused
implies an admission of guilt.9 Faced with this dilemma the defendant
will frequently take the stand despite his constitutional immunity from
becoming a witness.' 0
When an accused does take the stand to testify in his own behalf, to
what extent does he waive his privilege against self-incrimination and the
correlative privilege against adverse inference and comment? Most juris-
dictions" hold that upon taking the stand the prohibition against infer-
ences and comment upon the defendant's failure to testify comes to an
end, at least as to matters material and relevant to the present pro-
ceeding.'" Once he has ascended the witness stand the accused is held
accountable for his failure to properly deny or explain the evidence
against him. It is assumed that one should naturally so respond having
taken that opportunity, and the failure to do so is subject to both comment
and inference.' 3
This note will examine whether this waiver should also permit
comment to be made concerning an accused's failure or refusal to testify
during a prior proceeding; i. e., at a time when the privilege existed and
any comment would have been prohibited.
This probe is necessarily predicated upon the judicial interpretation
of the legislative mandate promulgated in each jurisdiction. 4 In the
majority of those states which have dealt with this problem, 5 the courts
have liberally construed the statutory prohibitions against comment on
the defendant's failure to testify. 6 In extending the safeguard these courts
9. See the introductory discussion in 8 J. WiGmoas, supra note 2, § 2272, at 425-426;
and the concluding paragraph of C. McCoRmIcK, EviDENcE § 132, at 280-281 (1954).
10. In an opinion that aptly enunciated the quandary in which an accused finds himself,
it was said:
[W]e consider that it is of the utmost importance to the fair trial of a defendant
that he should not be placed upon the horns of a dilemma, that is: either to testify
and become a witness against himself or have the jury prejudiced against him for
his failure to do so.
Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d 662, 664 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
11. The discussion hereafter is inapplicable to those six states which allow comment
upon the defendant's failure to testify. See note 8 supra.
12. [The] voluntary offer of testimony (by an accused) upon any fact is a waiver
as to all other relevant facts because of the necessary connection between all ....
The result is, then, that the accused ... has signified his waiver by the initial act of
taking the stand." 8 J. WiwoRE, supra note 2, § 2276, at 459-62.
13. E.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Odom v. State, 109 So.2d
163 (Fla. 1959) ; Peel v. State, 154 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1963) as quoted in note 7 supra.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. The tone of this liberal construction is evident from this statement in State v.
Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 586, 154 S.W.2d 128, 134 (1941):
We must not interpret this provision of our Constitution as if it was designed to
protect the guilty, nor should we presume that one who avails himself of it is
[VOL. XXI
1967] CASES NOTED
have held that the failure to testify during a former proceeding is not
subject to an adverse comment at a subsequent proceeding wherein the
defendant elected to waive his immunity and become a witness. 7 The
prior proceedings embraced by these decisions include preliminary
hearings,' 8 applications for the settings or reduction of bail,' 9 habeas
corpus hearings,2 0 coroners inquests,2 grand jury actions,2  and former
trials." These decisions are ultimately founded on the premise that the
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination should be strictly limited
and does not include a concurrent retroactive waiver of that right where
it had been previously invoked during a separate and distinct proceeding.24
The underlying rationale employed by the majority can be classified
into two basic propositions. First, the defendant should be able to exercise
his statutory right without it subsequently being used by the state to his
disadvantage.2 5 Second, a failure to limit an accused's waiver of his
privilege against self-incrimination to the proceeding wherein he testified2"
hiding his guilt. The object of the law is to protect the innocent, and the law still
covers the man with the presumption of innocence, even when he refuses to give
testimony that might be turned against him.
17. Canada v. State, 22 Ala. 495, 117 So. 398 (1928); Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645,
190 So. 756 (1939); Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); Newman v.
Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 81, 88 S.W. 1089 (1905); Berg v. Penttila, 173 Minn.
512, 217 N.W. 935 (1928); State v. Youngquist, 176 Minn. 562, 223 N.W. 917 (1929);
State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 154 S.W.qd 128 (1941); Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery,
357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948); People v. Russo, 251 App. Div. 176, 295 N.Y.S.
457 (1937) ; People v. Hunnicutt, 15 App. Div. 2d 536, 222 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1961) ; Smithson
v. State, 127 Tenn. 357, 155 S.W. 133 (1913); Hare v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 6, 118 S.W.
544 (1909) ; Lee v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 113, 303 S.W.2d 406 (1957).
18. Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939) 17; Scroggins v. State, 97
Tex. Crim. 573, 263 S.W. 303 (1924) (an "examining trial" in Texas is synonymous with a
preliminary hearing). Contra, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 773, 118 S.E. 107
(1923).
19. Newman v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 81, 88 S.W. 1089 (1905).
20. Swilley v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 619, 166 S.W. 733 (1914).
21. Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. App. 1944). Contra, e.g., Allen v. State,
173 Md. 649, 197 A. 144 (1938).
22. See Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1937); People v. McCrea,
303 Mich. 213, 6 N.W.2d 489 (1942). Cf. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
23. Canada v. State, 22 Ala. 495, 117 So.2d 398 (1928); Smithson v. State, 127 Tenn.
357, 155 S.W. 133 (1913). Contra, e.g., Morton v. State, 208 Ark. 492, 187 S.W.2d 335
(1945). Cf. Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948).
24. For an analogous discussion of the various waiver possibilities that might occur if
the defendant determines to testify in his own behalf see 8 J. WiGmoRE, supra note 2,
§ 2276(b)(2).
25. Concerning this concept of unrestrained freedom in the exercise of a defendant's
rights, the court in State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 586, 154 S.W.2d 128, 134 (1941) held:
Since [the statutory protection against comment] is a right and a privilege granted
the citizen, he should be permitted to exercise it with complete freedom and not
at the peril of being impeached by it in the event that he should ever attempt
to assert his innocence. No suspicion or incrimination should follow the assertion
of a constitutionally given right.
26. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the jurisdictions that permit comment
upon a defendant's previous failure to testify once he has taken the stand, the waiver
principle seems to work only in retrospect. Thus voluntary testimony at a prior proceeding
is not a waiver for the main trial; nor is testimony at a prior trial a waiver for a subsequent
trial. An accused may, if he chooses, still invoke his right against self-incrimination and no.
comment can be made concerning it; notwithstanding his earlier testimony. See In re
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would bring pressure on him to testify in an initial proceeding for fear of
the consequences of his silence should a subsequent trial become neces-
sary. Conversely, if he failed to testify initially he may be forced to
remain silent throughout all proceedings lest his first silence be used
against him."
Those courts which permit the prosecutor to comment upon a
defendant's failure to testify in a prior proceeding also arrive at their
determination through statutory interpretation. Although the statutes
enacted in these jurisdictions are essentially the same as those governing
the jurisdictions which prohibit such comment,29 the courts have held
that a defendant unconditionally waives his right under those statutes
upon his election to take the stand and testify."° From the moment he
ascends the stand he is treated as any other witness.'
Insofar as the waiver during the present proceeding is deemed to be
total, it is construed to extend to all prior proceedings as well.32 Conse-
Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728 (1896)
State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944).
27. See Hare v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 6, 7, 188 S.W. 544, 545 (1909), wherein the court
reversed because the prosecutor elicited the fact that the defendant had not testified during
a former trial. In a portion of the opinion the court stated:
[T]o construe the statutory inhibition [against comment] as applying only to the
present trial would render it dangerous to any citizen's case if his counsel decided
not to put him on the stand, when, if a subsequent trial was had, the state's case
might be stronger and require defendant's testimony, and his previous silence (when
he had a right to be silent) be used as an indication of fabrication.
28. State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 154 S.W.2d 128 (1941).
29. See note 7 supra.
30. Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1937) contained the follow-
ing statement which succinctly illustrates the concept of waiver as applied by these courts:
The privilege of the defendant against self incrimination, and its corollary, the
prohibition against comment by counsel for the government upon his failure to
testify, have been jealously protected by the courts. But when the defendant elects,
voluntarily, to take the stand, he waives his privilege, subjects himself to cross-
examination and impeachment, and makes comment upon his testimony entirely
proper.
31. The most convincing reasons for holding the privilege waived by testifying on the
principal trial have been advanced by Mr. Justice Stone in the leading federal case of
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497-99 (1926) (emphasis added):
The immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by
offering himself as a witness. When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does
so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be
cross examined as to the facts in issue . . . . His waiver is not partial; having
once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever
cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing . . . . The safeguards
against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to become
witnesses in their own behalf, and not for those who do. There is a sound policy
in requiring the accused who offers himself as a witness to do so without reserva-
tion, as does any other witness. We can discern nothing in the policy of the law
against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any
trial, or to any tribunal, other than that in which the defendant preserves it by
refusing to testify.
32. See, e.g., Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926) ; Tomlinson v. United States,
93 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1937). But see, Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957),
where the prosecutor elicited from the defendant on cross examination the fact that he had
refused to testify before a grand jury. Four Justices, concurring, felt such cross examination
violated privilege and that Raffel v. United States, supra, should be overruled.
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quently, the protection against self-incrimination under the statute is lost
to the defendant and the prosecutor may properly elicit comment upon
and draw adverse or incriminating inferences from the defendant's
failure to offer testimony at any prior proceeding.
In the instant case,"3 the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the
decision of the First District Court of Appeal34 and held that it was not
error for the prosecutor on cross-examination to interrogate the defendant
concerning his failure to testify at the preliminary hearing. The court
expressly repudiated the cases of Simmons v. State5 and Hathaway v.
State"' and thereby overruled the former Florida position. The decision
was predicated on the theory that since a defendant cannot be forced to
take the stand, he is protected from such adverse comments. However, if
he elects to testify he should be treated as any other witness and thus
comment on his previous failure to testify should be allowed.3 7
It would seem that the better answer to the problem presented is
found in the reasoning of those jurisdictions which prohibit comment on
a defendant's failure to testify at a preliminary proceeding. As opposed
to this, those courts which make prior silence a proper subject for comment
if the defendant later testifies inherently place an unrealistic burden upon
the accused. In effect, they require a defendant to anticipate during the
preliminary stages the multitude of factors which will finally govern his
decision whether or not to testify at trial. Under this latter rationale, the
maxim "speak now, or forever hold your peace" was never more mean-
ingful.
ALAN E. WEINSTEIN
33. State v. Hines, 195 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
34. Hines v. State, 186 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
35. 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939).
36. 100 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
37. In setting forth the underlying rationale of its decision, the Hines court quoted
Odom v. State, 109 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1959):
Whether or not a defendant becomes a witness for himself is purely a question for
decision by him. If he elects not to testify, he is to be classified as a silent defendant
whose silence must be ignored . . . . But if he decides to do so he is then to be
regarded as any other witness, his testimony will be weighed the same as that of
any other witness and the jury may in evaluating it take into consideration his
interest in the trial and its result. And argument directed to what he says and
does not say will be completely justified.
195 So.2d, at 551.
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